If bidders are uncertain about their value when they participate in an auction, they may overbid and su¤er ex-post losses. Limited liability mitigates these losses, and may result in more aggressive bidding and higher seller revenue, but also in an ine¢ cient allocation. Using a combination of theory and experiment, we analyze three di¤erent forms of liability in second-price auctions: full liability, limited liability by default with varying penalties, and resale-based limited liability. With a default penalty, bids are higher than under full liability, but …nal revenue and e¢ ciency are lower due to the frequency of default. Auctions with resale result in the highest revenue and allocative e¢ ciency, and are as e¤ective as a low default penalty in alleviating bidders'losses. Hence, allowing resale as a form of limited liability may be preferred by both bidders and sellers over other liability rules.
Introduction
It is common in many auctions that bidders are uncertain of their valuations for the item on sale when placing their bids. Examples range from auctions for second-hand items on eBay, auto salvage, foreclosure and commodities such as cotton or timber, where the quality of the item is uncertain, to large-scale spectrum auctions with uncertain future demand. 1 When the value of an item cannot be easily veri…ed prior to placing a bid, or when the exact value is realized only after the auction is concluded, bidders must choose their bids carefully. Even with meticulous planning, however, bidders may su¤er losses if they overbid relative to their realized …nal value (e.g., Pagnozzi, 2007b) .
Given the potential for overbidding and possible losses, liability rules stipulated by auction designers prior to the auction taking place have a signi…cant e¤ect on bidders' behavior and the …nal allocation. In his practical guide for auction design, Klemperer (2002) highlights the importance of properly structured default penalties: "If default costs are small, then bidders are bidding for options on prizes rather than the prizes themselves" (p.176).
In fact, the failure to properly design clear auction payment and default rules can have dramatic e¤ects. For example, McMillan (1994) reports of an Australian auction for satellite television services where there was no penalty for default and the rules speci…ed that the licenses were awarded to the next highest bid in the case of default. The unexpected "dark horse winners" gamed the auction by placing high winning bids that they had no intention of ful…lling, as well as other lower bids. After a series of defaults, the licenses were awarded for an amount substantially below the original highest bids, and one of the winners then resold for a pro…t. According to McMillan (1994) , "The ‡aw in the auction rules, the source of the cascading bids, was the absence of a penalty for default, which meant bids were not meaningful" (p. 149).
However, how an auction designer should optimally set default penalties, or whether he should even allow default, is a nontrivial decision as di¤erent rules will have di¤ering e¤ects on bidding behavior and auction outcomes. In the …eld, a variety of di¤erent default and liability rules are observed, some of which appear to have been introduced in an ad hoc manner.
At one end of the liability spectrum, in some auctions bidders are allowed to default with no penalty, through bid retraction or even non-payment. For example, in the online marketplace eBay winning bidders can ask for a full bid retraction. 2 At the other end of the liability spectrum, bidders are fully liable for any bid placed. While the bulk of auction research assumes full liability, enforcing full liability in practice is di¢ cult, since it requires mechanisms to ensure full payment by winners, such as a refundable deposit equal to the maximum possible bid. With uncertain valuations, full liability leads to more conservative bidding because winning bidders have no outside option in the event of a loss. Full liability, however, may increase e¢ ciency by limiting default. 1 A similar uncertainty also arises when bidders purchase to resell in a secondary market. 2 Winning bidders can also just refuse to pay. While this behavior is recorded by eBay which could result in future restrictions, no speci…c monetary penalty is imposed.
Between the extremes of costless default and full liability, there are many common environments where default is allowed with a monetary penalty. For example, defaulting bidders in the FCC C-Block Auctions paid "a penalty equal to the di¤erence between the amount bid and the amount of the winning bid the next time the license is o¤ered by the Commission plus an additional penalty equal to 3 percent of the subsequent winning bid." 3 In many other auctions, bidders make an initial deposit equal to a percentage of the maximum bid, which is forfeited in the event of default. For example, to participate in timber auctions in the U.S. state of Washington, bidders pay a deposit of 10%, which is increased to 25% for previous defaulters. 4 Since these penalties require a payment which is lower than the full amount owed, they might help winning bidders mitigate realized losses. Hence, the option of default may allow bidders to bid more aggressively, which raises (nominal) revenue but also increases the probability of an ine¢ cient default. Clearly, the choice of a default penalty should balance the trade-o¤ between revenue and the probability of default, which depends on the behavioral response by bidders.
All statutory limited liability elements are typically explicitly speci…ed in the auction rules.
In addition, a di¤erent and less obvious form of (non-statutory) limited liability for bidders arises through the opportunity to resell an item acquired in an auction, before having to pay the auction price. Resale is a common occurrence in a variety of auctions where bidders face uncertainty about their private valuations. 5 In fact, once uncertainty over valuations is resolved, a winning bidder who realizes he paid more than his actual value is willing to resell to a new buyer with a higher value, thus limiting his losses or even making a total pro…t. Therefore, allowing resale provides an outside option to auction winners who overpaid and create a form of limited liability. 6 Essentially, while with default limited liability arises through the possibility of returning the item to the initial seller, with resale it arises through the possibility of exchanging it with another bidder. It follows that allowing resale may induce more aggressive bidding, thus increasing revenue without the threat of default. And it can also lead to e¢ ciency gains since items are resold to higher-valued buyers.
Although bidders' theoretical response to outside options should result in more aggressive bidding with limited liability, their actual behavior across di¤erent liability rules may depend on a number of behavioral reasons. For example, bidders may di¤er in their risk tolerance or, with resale-based limited liability, they may be less sophisticated than theoretically assumed and therefore unable to integrate a resale opportunity into their strategies. Thus, it is unclear how actual bidders react to di¤erent limited liability environments, including those with more 6 While in reality restricting post-auction resale may be di¢ cult, there are various auctions where resale is not allowed. For example, resale was explicitly forbidden in the early U.S. spectrum auctions conducted by the FCC, and in European countries. More recently, the FCC has relaxed restrictions on resale, but may impose penalties for transactions taking place less than 5 years after the auction (see 47 C.F.R. section 1.2111 of the FCC).
nuanced incentives such as resale or high default penalties. 7 In order to address these issues, we analyze how bidding behavior and auction outcomes change across di¤erent liability environments, using a combination of theory and economic experiments. We consider a second price auction with two risk neutral bidders who observe a private signal of their value, which then becomes known at the conclusion of the auction. Three di¤erent settings are compared: full liability, limited liability induced through default with a penalty payment, and resale-based limited liability. The baseline environment is full liability, where the winner always pays the auction price. In the limited liability environment the winner can default by paying a percentage of the auction price, while with resale-based limited liability the winner can resell the item to a losing bidder after the auction.
In theory, bidding in all limited liability treatments should be more aggressive than with full liability, with the strongest di¤erences for lower private signals. For higher private signals, predicted di¤erences between liability rules are less stark and, depending on the default penalty, bidding may be equivalent to full liability.
Our experiment consists of four treatments: Full Liability, 5% Default, 25% Default, and
Resale. These treatments mimic the theoretical environment and were designed to ensure tight control over decisions to accurately test the response of bidders to varying liability rules. In the default treatments, the winning bidder was forced to default whenever his loss in the auction was lower than the loss with default, by paying either a 5% or a 25% default penalty. In the resale treatment, whenever the winner had a lower realized value than the loser, the item was transferred to the loser at a resale price equal to his value. We introduce these controls over decisions (which abstract from real world scenarios where default is a choice and resale involves a less structured process) in order to cleanly test bidders' reaction to the default and resale environments, without confounds such as pro…table default or resale failing to occur because of bidders'mistakes. 8 We …nd that bidding behavior does vary across di¤erent liability environments. In support of the theoretical predictions, bidding behavior is most aggressive in the 5% default treatment.
We also …nd that bidders are able to integrate the incentives of the resale market into their bidding decisions, which results in higher bids, but the e¤ect of resale weakens over time. So we have partial support of the theory in the case of resale-based limited liability. In contrast to predictions, we …nd that bidding behavior under a high default penalty (25%) is similar to full liability, so bidders only react to limited liability induced through default when the penalty is relatively low.
These results indicate that bidders are sensitive to the type of liability environment they face 7 Previous studies (Roelofs, 2002 , and Onderstal and Van der Veen, 2011) …nd empirical evidence that bidders respond to strong limited liability incentives (full costless default or very low penalties) compared to a full liability baseline.
in an auction, but in contrast to theoretical predictions they do not always respond to limited liability by bidding more aggressively. Roelofs (2002) and Onderstal and Van der Veen (2011) provide previous experimental evidence of more aggressive bidders' behavior but consider full default and a low and …xed default penalty, respectively. Hence, their results are in-line with the behavior observed under a low default penalty in our experiment.
Turning to seller revenue, while bids are observed to be highest under the 5% default rule, the …nal revenue achieved in this case was often lower due to the prevalence of default. Consequently, revenue is highest in the resale treatment. The resale treatment also resulted in the highest allocative e¢ ciency. From the bidder's perspective, average earnings are essentially equivalent across all environments (including full liability). Conditional on making a loss, resale or a low default penalty (5%) were most e¤ective at mitigating losses. Therefore, our results suggest that resale may be the preferred limited liability mechanism by both sellers and bidders. The reason is that, in addition to allowing bidders to limit losses once uncertainty over their valuations is realized, resale also allows to correct an ine¢ cient allocation of the item achieved in the auction due to this uncertainty, while default does not and may even increase ine¢ ciency by delaying the …nal allocation to the bidder with the highest value.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief discussion of the related literature, in the next section we present the theoretical predictions. Section 3 describes the design of the experiment. Section 4 discusses the experiment results and the last section concludes.
Related Literature. This paper contributes to the literature on limited liability in auctions. A number of theoretical papers have established that changing the liability of a bidder changes the underlying incentives of the auction which a¤ects bidding behavior and ultimately, auction outcomes. For example, Waehrer (1995) demonstrates that under a bid deposit, which is the maximum payment required under default, bids become more aggressive as the deposit amount is decreased which also leads to higher levels of default. Harstad and Rothkopf (1995) On the experimental side, to our knowledge, only two papers deal with limited liability rules in the auction setting. 9 Roelofs (2002) examines a common value procurement auction with 9 Other experimental papers have addressed the possibility of default and limited liability, in a di¤erent sense. Limited liability created by budget constraints was examined by Hasen & Lott (1991) in a comment regarding the design of Kagel & Levin (1986) . A typical constraint faced in economic experiments, and the issue raised by Hasen & Lott, is that subjects cannot make losses. Therefore, subjects with low cash balances have limited full (costless) default, …nding empirical evidence that bidders do choose to bid more aggressively when default is allowed, but mixed evidence on the e¤ectiveness of the theory to predict behavior.
Onderstal and Van der Veen (2011) analyze …rst and second price auctions with a …xed penalty in the event of default …nding that bidders react more aggressively than theory predicts to the presence of limited liability. Our paper di¤ers from both of these studies in three important ways: (i) di¤erences across limited liability formats are examined (ii) resale is introduced as a market-based form of limited liability (iii) the default penalty is changed to a percentage-based penalty, and responses to the level of the penalty are also examined.
Theoretical Analysis Model
In this section, we construct a simple model that provides the framework to experimentally investigate the e¤ects of di¤erent liability environments on bidding strategies and auction outcomes. We consider a (sealed-bid) second-price auction for one item, with no reserve price: bidders simultaneously submit a bid for the item; the highest bidder is awarded the item and pays a price equal to the second-highest bid.
There are 2 risk-neutral bidders. The …nal use value for the item for the seller is 0, while the …nal use value for bidder i is
Prior to the auction, bidder i observes the private signal x i which is drawn from a uniform distribution on the support [0; x]. However, the bidder does not know " i , an idiosyncratic and uncertain component of his valuation, which is equal to 0 with probability 1 2 , and is equal to " with probability and
After the auction, both bidders learn both use values -i.e., v 1 and v 2 become common knowledge. 10 liability because the downside loss is capped at zero. Kagel & Levin (1991) respond to this comment with how they controlled for limited liability by providing cash endowments to the subjects that covered the maximum possible loss. Budget constraints can also be viewed as a form of market-based limited liability, but this type of liability is not examined in this paper. 1 0 The assumption that a bidder learns the use value of his opponent simpli…es the analysis of the resale market but does not a¤ect our qualitative results. This valuation structure captures an environment where bidders are uncertain about their exact valuations when they participate in the auction, but this uncertainty is resolved after the auction. Therefore, the auction winner may end up paying more than his valuation for the item on sale, and realize it after the auction terminates. In this case, the auction winner may prefer not to keep the item and pay the auction price, if he is protected by some form of limited liability.
We consider three di¤erent liability environments after the auction:
1. Full Liability: the winning bidder must pay the entirety of the auction price to the seller.
2. Statutory Limited Liability through Default: the winning bidder can default (after learning his use value), return the item to the seller and only pay a fraction 2 (0; 1) of the auction price to the seller.
3. Market-Based Limited Liability through Resale: the winning bidder cannot default but can resell the item to the losing bidder, by making a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. 11 While many other resale mechanisms yield qualitative predictions that are similar to the ones that we will describe, our set-up provides a clean framework to analyze the response of bidders to the limited liability aspects of a resale opportunity, which is our primary topic of interest. With this modelling choice, the resale market yields the highest pro…t to the winning bidder, since he can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er equal to the value of the losing bidder, thus obtaining the whole resale surplus. Therefore, bidders'response to resale-based limited liability should be strongest in our environment.
We focus on symmetric equilibrium bid strategies, that are increasing in bidders' private signals.
Full Liability
With full liability, if bidder i wins the auction at price p, he earns an expected pro…t equal to E[v i ] p; while if he loses the auction, he earns 0. Therefore, in a second-price auction bidder i bids a price such that his expected pro…t from winning is equal to zero -i.e.,
The bidder with the highest private signal wins the auction and the allocation is ine¢ cient whenever bidder i wins but v j > v i -i.e., with probability " 4x . 12 Moreover, the auction winner obtains negative pro…t whenever the bid of his competitor is higher than its use value. 1 1 This is similar to the resale market structure analyzed by Calzolari and Pavan (2006) , for example, who assume that the proposer of the take-it-or-leave-it o¤er is chosen randomly. 1 2 This is the probability that "i = 0 and "j = " and xj < xi < xj + ".
Speci…cally, bidder i obtains negative pro…ts when
2 and " i = 0 -i.e., with probability " 4x . 13 
Limited Liability through Resale
Suppose now that the winning bidder can resell. With symmetric and increasing bidding functions, bidder i wins the auction if and only if x i > x j and resells to bidder j (by making an o¤er equal to v j ) if and only if
Therefore, conditional on bidder i winning the auction, resale requires that: (i) " j = ", (ii)
In a second-price auction, bidder i bids a price equal to his expected pro…t from winning the auction (because if he loses, he obtains zero even if he buys from the auction winner) -i.e., In the Appendix, we show that the equilibrium bidding function with resale is
" if x i < ";
Since the winning bidder has the option of reselling the item to the losing bidder who may have a higher use value, this provides a form of limited liability in the event that the winning bidder turns out to have a low value. The resale option can mitigate losses at the conclusion of the auction (if the auction price is higher than the realized value of the winner) or increase the pro…t of the winner bidder (when there are gains from trade in the resale market). Consequently, in the auction, a bidder is willing to bid a price that re ‡ects the value of this option (i.e., the expected resale price) and equilibrium bidding behavior is therefore more aggressive than with full liability:
Moreover, compared to the case with full liability, with resale the seller's revenue is higher and the …nal allocation is always e¢ cient.
In our experiments, we let x = 50 and " = 20, so that the equilibrium bidding function with resale is 
Limited Liability through Default
If a bidder defaults after winning the auction, he returns the item to the seller and pays a penalty which is a percentage of the auction price. Therefore, a bidder chooses to default after winning the auction at price p if and only if his pro…t from keeping the item and paying the auction price is lower than the default penalty -i.e.,
and the actual pro…t of the auction winner is max fv i p; pg :
The choice to default critically depends on . As ! 1, the pro…t converges to the full liability case and bidders never choose to default. As decreases, default becomes more attractive for the winning bidder. As ! 0, we have the strongest form of limited liability: the winner always defaults when v i < p and never earns negative pro…t. In the Appendix, we show that a bidder defaults if and only if " i = 0 and
The equilibrium bidding function with default is
When a bidder's private signal is su¢ ciently high, the bidder never chooses to default and bids as with full liability. By contrast, when a bidder's private signal is low, he bids a percentage of his highest possible value and more aggressively than with full liability. The reason is that the bidder knows he can cut down his losses in case the realization of the idiosyncratic component is low: he has the option of giving up an item with low value and only pay a fraction of the
Notice that the degree of a bidder's aggressiveness with default is inversely related to the penalty : the higher the penalty, the lower the equilibrium bid. Moreover, the threshold x is decreasing in : the higher the penalty, the easier it is that the bidder does not choose to default, so that the bidder bids more aggressively due to limited liability for lower values only.
Of course, if the winner defaults and returns the item to the seller, then the allocation is ine¢ cient. Assuming that x 1, this happens whenever bidder i wins the auction but " i = 0 -i.e., with probability . Hence, the probability of a …nal ine¢ cient allocation is higher than with full liability if and only if x > ".
With the parameters used in our experiment, the bidding function with default is
In the experiment, we implement two default treatments: one with a high penalty = 0:25;
and one with a low penalty = 0:05. When = 0:05, bidders always bid more aggressively than with full liability (since x = 190, which is higher than the maximum private signal). When 
Theoretical Predictions
Summing up, the theoretical predictions for our experiments are as follows:
Result 1. Bids and auction prices are higher with a low default penalty than with resale, and are higher with resale than with full liability -i.e., b D ( Result 2. Bids and auction prices are higher with a low default penalty than with a high default penalty,and are (weakly) higher with a high default penalty than with full liability -i.e., Result 4. The probability of a …nal ine¢ cient allocation of the item on sale is 0 with resale, and is higher with a low default penalty than with full liability.
Experiment Design
The experiments are designed to analyze bidding behavior and auction outcomes under four di¤ering liability treatments. The baseline full liability treatment requires winning bidders to keep the item and pay the full auction price, even when making losses. The three remaining treatments introduce forms of limited liability that vary between a high default penalty where bidders are liable for 25% of the auction price if they default, a low default penalty where bidders only pay 5% of the auction price under default, and a resale treatment where trading automatically takes place in a post-auction resale market if the auction winner does not have the highest value.
In all treatments, each round began with a second-price (clock) auction with 2 bidders bidding for a hypothetical item of uncertain value. 15 Each bidder observed a signal of the value, Bidders participated in the auction through a computer interface showing a bid clock increasing from 0 in increments of 1. The clock represented the current price and subjects chose to "drop out" at a price that they were not willing to pay. In contrast to a more typical implementation of an ascending auction, subjects were not made aware of the dropout price of their opponent and the auction only ended when both bidders dropped out. The winner was the subject who dropped out last, and the auction price was equal to the …rst dropout bid. 16 If neither subject dropped out, the auction automatically ended at a price of 70, the maximum possible …nal use value. Ties were broken randomly by the computer software.
At the conclusion of the auction, the …nal use values were randomly drawn by the computer software. A bidder who won the item earned the di¤erence between his …nal value and the auction price. In the default penalty treatments, if the winning bidder was making losses he would automatically default if the penalty payment under default, which was a percentage of the auction price, was less than the loss from not defaulting. In the resale treatment, (regardless of whether he was making losses) a winning bidder who did not have the highest value automatically traded the item at a resale price equal to the highest realized value. The winning bidder would then earn the di¤erence between the resale price and the auction price. While alternative, nonautomated, bargaining mechanisms for resale could have been used (e.g., free-form bargaining), our design allowed us to keep experimental control over the resale market. 17 The treatments are summarized below:
Full Liability (F): The winner is fully liable for all losses in the event that earnings are negative.
Resale (R):
If the losing bidder has a higher realized …nal value than the winner, the winner automatically resells to the losing bidder at a price equal to the losing bidder's value.
5% Default (D5%):
If by paying the auction price the winner would make a loss higher than the default penalty, he automatically defaults and pays 5% of the auction price.
25% Default (D25%):
If by paying the auction price the winner would make a loss higher than the default penalty, he automatically defaults and pays 25% of the auction Subjects were students at Florida State University recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) .
At the start of the experiment, they ran through the Holt and Laury (HL) (2002) risk preferences procedure, and one of the choices was randomly chosen for payment. Prior to the beginning of each treatment, subjects were given instructions that included an example of bidding behavior, and the opportunity to participate in one unpaid practice period against a computerized robot bidder. All subjects participated in 30 paid auction rounds. In the …rst ten rounds subjects participated in the full liability baseline (5 periods) followed by one of the limited liability treatments (5 periods). The last rounds were 10 periods of the full liability baseline, followed by 10 periods of a limited liability treatment. Table 3 .1 summarizes the treatment and session structure.
We ran a total of 6 sessions, with 16 participants per session divided into 2 groups for random rematching of partners in each period, leading to two independent groups (subsessions) per session. In the results section, the analysis is performed with clustering at the subsession level since this is the …rst level of independence. The same value draws were used in all treatments.
The experiment was programmed using Z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) . Subjects'earnings were denominated in experimental currency units (ECUs), exchanged into dollars at a rate of $0.04 per ECU. Subjects were given an endowment of 150 ECUs, from which losses and pro…ts were tallied. The earnings from the HL procedure were not included in this endowment. Average earnings of the subjects were $28.16, including the show-up fee of $10 and HL earnings.
Results
We now describe the main experimental results. Section 4.1 presents summary statistics. The remaining sections provide formal regression analysis and statistical tests of the observed regularities: Section 4.2 considers bidding behavior, while Section 4.3 discusses revenue, e¢ ciency, and earnings.
Summary Statistics
We begin with summary statistics that provide a broad picture of the main treatment e¤ects. Auction prices equal the …rst drop out bid in a group and are highest in the resale and 5% default treatments, mirroring the results for average bids. In contrast to the theoretical predictions, average auction prices are slightly higher in the resale treatment than in the 5% default treatment. Restricting the data to the last 20 periods reverses this ranking, but the di¤erences between the two treatments remain small.
The …nal revenue earned by the seller in the auction takes into account default and it is equal to the percentage of the auction price paid by the winner in case of default, and to the auction price otherwise (i.e., in the resale, full liability, and default treatments with no default). The theoretical predictions are based on the realized …nal draws from the experiment. As expected, default lowers revenue compared to the auction price, especially in the D5% treatment. The resale treatment results in the highest revenue, while revenue in the two default treatments is lower than in the full liability baseline. Table 4 .2 summarizes bidders' earnings at the auction stage and …nal earnings which are adjusted for default and resale (columns 1 and 2). We also report auction and …nal average losses (i.e., earnings conditional on a bidder paying more than his value in the auction). The last three columns provide relative frequencies of auctions ending with bidder losses, default, and resale (by the winner to the highest-value bidder). We include comparisons to the theoretical predictions, based on the realized …nal draws from the experiment (rather than expectation), to evaluate the relative performance of theoretical behavior given the realized values. 18 Higher auction prices in the R and D5% treatments resulted in lower auction earnings for bidders, but resale and default helped raise …nal earnings by limiting losses. With full liability, bidders obtain higher average …nal earnings; but when the data is restricted to the last 20 periods, bidders are similarly well-o¤ in all treatments, with average earnings around 15. After the auction, bidder losses were reduced by all limited liability rules, with the strongest e¤ect in the R and D5% treatments.
Losses at the auction stage and default were most common in the low penalty (D5%) treatment, which is expected since bidding is most aggressive in this treatment. The full liability (F) treatment results in the lowest frequency of losses, as predicted. Restricting the data to the last 20 periods, however, shows that bidders were least likely to make losses in the D25% treatment.
Resale markets opened in approximately 29% of auctions, which is 11 percentage points higher than the theoretical prediction. The resale market was not only used to mitigate losses; out of the 71 resale events, in 32 cases (45%) the winning bidder was not making losses in the auction. :75 Table 4 .3: Average observed e¢ ciency. Theoretical predictions in parentheses. Table 4 .3 summarizes auction e¢ ciency and how (…nal) e¢ ciency changes after the resolution of value uncertainty, as well as after resale and default when relevant. Theoretical predictions are based on signal draws for pre-lottery e¢ ciency and realized …nal values for post-lottery and …nal e¢ ciency. The random e¢ ciency measures in the last two columns results from allocating the item to each of the two bidders with equal probability.
The uncertainty in …nal value creates two forms of auction e¢ ciency. The pre-lottery e¢ -ciency is de…ned as the ratio between the signal of the auction winner and the highest signal of a bidders. In theory, this should be 1 in all treatments because bid functions are symmetric and increasing in private signals. The observed pre-lottery auction e¢ ciency, while lower than 1, is relatively high, with no notable di¤erence across treatments. The post-lottery auction ef…ciency, calculated after the resolution of value uncertainty, is de…ned as the ratio between the value of the winner and the highest realized value. In all treatments, this is slightly lower than pre-lottery e¢ ciency.
Because of default or resale, …nal allocative e¢ ciency may di¤er from auction e¢ ciency.
Notice that resale generates a …nal e¢ ciency of 1 as the item is transferred to the bidder with the highest realized value, while default generates a …nal e¢ ciency of 0 since the item is returned to the seller. Final e¢ ciency is lower in the D5% and D25% treatments, as bidders often exercised the default option, especially with a low penalty option.
Random e¢ ciency is de…ned as the average of the two bidders'signals divided by the maximum signal. The auction always outperforms a random allocation in terms of e¢ ciency. The limited liability environment, however, can negatively impact e¢ ciency. In fact, …nal e¢ ciency with a low default penalty (D5%) is lower than with a random allocation, because of the very high default rates. Following the average bid patterns observed in table 4.1, bids appear higher with limited liability through resale (R) or with a low default penalty (D5%) than under full liability (F).
Bidding Behavior
Contrasting the regression line with the theoretical prediction, it is evident that observed bids are less aggressive than predicted in both default treatments. In the R and F treatments, regression lines are above prediction for lower signals; while observed bids are at or below the prediction for higher signals.
Although bids should lie between the signal and the upper bound of the …nal use value in all treatments, we do observe bids outside of these bounds. 20 Bids above the upper bound appear most frequently in the R and D5% treatments, while bids below the lower bound appear more frequently in the F and D25% treatments. 21 In the analysis that follows, we report results based on all observations. In the appendix, we also present results excluding bids outside the bounds.
For a general view of treatment di¤erences in bidding, we conduct power analysis on subsession averages for bids. The strongest analysis lies in the comparison of the F treatments to the limited liability treatments, due to the within subjects design. Comparing F versus R (using only the subset of F(R) means), subsession averages of 35.2 for F(R) and 38.1 for R are signi…cantly di¤erent (p = 0:01), with an estimated power of 98%. 22 Subsession averages of 35.5
for F(D5%) and 38.6 for D5% are also signi…cantly di¤erent (p = 0:03), and the power of this 1 9 To improve readability, we only plot bids placed in rounds 3, 8, 13, 16, 23, and 26. 2 0 In the resale treatment, bidding above the upper bound might be due to speculation (bidding aggressively to win the item and resell). However, this cannot explain overbidding in the default and full liability treatments. The observed overbidding is similar to behavior in sealed-bid second price auctions with known valuations (Kagel et al., 1987; Cooper and Hang, 2008) . This form of overbidding is di¤erent from the one observed in …rst price auction because of risk aversion (Cox et al., 1988) . 2 1 Bidders choosing to bid below the lower bound of the lottery was also observed by Katok and Salmon (2009) in a similar experimental design under full liability rules. 2 2 The estimated mean e¤ect under R for a test with 80% power and = 0:05 is 37.12. test is 78%. 23 In the comparison of F(D25%) and D25%, the subsession averages of 32.9 and 34.2 are not signi…cantly di¤erent (p = 0:27). The estimated e¤ect size in the D25% treatment for a power level of 80%, = 0:05, and given the mean bid of 32.9 in the F(D25%) treatment is 36.9, which is above what we observe.
Examining subsession average bids across limited liability treatments, there is a notable di¤erence between the R and D25% treatments with subsession averages of 38.1 and 34.2, which are signi…cantly di¤erent from each other (p = 0:06). However the power of this test is only 50%
given the between subjects nature of the data. 24 Similarly, we observe di¤erences between the D5% and D25% treatments (averages of 38.6 and 34.2, p = 0:10), but the power is 37% due to a higher di¤erence in standard deviations. 25 2 3 The estimated mean e¤ect under D5% for a test with 80% power and = 0:05 is 38.7. 2 4 To reach a power level of 80%, given = 0:05, we would need 14 independent observations (the current data has 8). 2 5 Despite having a similar di¤erence in means to the R/D25% comparison, the di¤erence in standard deviations To test the relationship between theoretical and actual bids, we analyze regressions with the observed bid as the dependent variable and the predicted theoretical bid as the independent variable for each treatment (see table A.1 in the appendix). When observed bids match the theoretical predictions, the coe¢ cient on the theoretical bid should equal to 1. In the F and R treatments, post-estimation tests did not reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ cient on the theoretical bid is 1 (p 0:13), demonstrating adherence to the theory. In the D5% treatment, this coe¢ cient is .91 and signi…cantly di¤erent from 1 (p = 0:02), indicating that bidding with a low default penalty is less aggressive than predicted. In the D25% treatment, we also …nd evidence that observed bids are lower than predicted with a coe¢ cient of .94, however the p-value resulting from the coe¢ cient test for di¤erence from 1 is only marginally signi…cant (p = 0:09). 26 To examine the treatment e¤ects on bidding behavior, table 4.4 presents …xed e¤ects regression results with bid as the dependent variable. Models 1 and 2 examine basic treatment e¤ects, while models 3-6 account for di¤erences based on low and high signal draws. Models 1, 3, and 5 use data from all periods, while models 2, 4, 6 restrict the data to the last 20 periods. In all speci…cations, the full liability treatment is the baseline and all models include the private signal draw x i and treatment dummies.
The positive signi…cant coe¢ cients on all treatment dummies in model 1 indicate that bids are signi…cantly higher in all limited liability treatments than in the full liability baseline, probetween D5%/D25% was higher. Hence, to reach a power level of 80%, given = 0:05, we would need 20 independent observations (the current data has 8).
viding support for the theoretical predictions. Post-estimation tests between the limited liability coe¢ cients also demonstrate signi…cant di¤erences between the D25% and both the D5% In model 2, 4, and 6, the positive signi…cant coe¢ cient on the D5% treatment across all speci…cations restricted to the last 20 periods indicate that bids are signi…cantly higher than in the full liability baseline, while no signi…cant di¤erences are found for the R and D25% treatments. Notice, however, that this is not necessarily due to a reduction in aggressive bidding in these treatments, because the higher constant in models 2 and 4 indicates higher average bids than in the full liability treatment. This mirrors what was observed in the average bids summary in table 4.1. Consequently, the increase in bids in the baseline F makes it less likely to observe di¤erences, unless bids are also increasing in the limited liability treatments.
Coe¢ cient tests between the limited liability treatments in model 2 demonstrate signi…cant di¤erences between the D5% and both R and D25% treatments (p = 0:04 and p = 0:02, respectively), while no signi…cant di¤erence emerges between the R and D25% treatments (p = 0:59).
Results are similar for coe¢ cient tests in model 4. 27 In model 6, coe¢ cient tests show no significance di¤erence between the limited liability treatments (p 0:60), con…rming that for higher signals treatment di¤erences are minimal in later periods. 28 Empirical Result 1: Bidding with limited liability is more aggressive than with full liability (F), especially in the low default penalty (D5%) and resale (R) treatments. This di¤ erence decreases over time, except in the low default penalty (D5%) treatment. 2 7 Coe¢ cient tests between the D5% and R or D5% and D25% report p < 0:01, while the test between R and D25% reports p = 0:37. 2 8 We report the same set of regressions with observations where bidders bid below their signal or above the upper bound for …nal value omitted in table A.2 in the appendix. Similar to the regressions testing the theoretical bid, the discussed results qualitatively hold, with a notable di¤erence in the R treatment. In this case, bidding more aggressively than the F treatment is then only marginally signi…cant. Of course, with resale, speculation is a possible strategy, so bidding above bounds can be explained by this and so the restricted results are not as informative since overbidding is not necessarily due to mistakes in bidding.
Outcomes
In this section, we formally analyze outcomes including auction prices, sellers'revenue, e¢ ciency, and buyers'earnings. Table 4 .5 presents pooled OLS regressions on auction price, …nal revenue, and …nal e¢ ciency.
The …rst two models have the auction price as the dependent variable; model 1 includes data from all periods and model 2 is the restricted to the last 20 periods. The variables X (1) and X (2) represent the highest and second highest signal draws in each auction group, respectively.
We also include variables for the risk pro…le of the participants in an auction group: max Safe is the highest number of safe choices and min Safe is the minimum number of safe choices made by a participant in the Holt and Laury (2002) By theoretical results 1-4, the auction price should be highest in the D5% treatment and lowest in the F treatment (and also in the D25% treatment for higher signals). The results in table 4.5 partially support the theory. The signi…cant coe¢ cients on the R and D5% treatment dummies and joint coe¢ cient tests between the R and D5% treatments (p > 0:212) provide evidence that auction prices are highest in the D5% treatment, but also that they are equivalently high in the R treatment (in contrast to predictions). The second highest signal impacts the auction price more than the highest signal, which is expected in a second price auction where the highest losing bid sets the price.
Empirical Result 2: Auction prices are highest in the low default penalty (D5%) and resale (R) treatments, and lowest in the high default penalty (D25%) and full liability (F) treatments. In model 1, the negative coe¢ cients on the D25% treatment dummy indicates that bidders earned signi…cantly less under the 25% default penalty than full liability (F). For the R and D5% 
Conclusion
We study how di¤erent liability conditions a¤ect bidder strategies in auctions with uncertain values, and consequently revenue, e¢ ciency, and bidders'welfare. Evidence from an incentivized environment shows that bidders do respond to changes in liability rules, but the level of the response depends on the form and level of liability. Bidders are most aggressive when statutory liability requirements (i.e. default payments) are low, but they also respond aggressively to external market-based limited liability induced by the presence of a resale market. In contrast to predictions, bids under a high default penalty are not more aggressive than with full liability and are signi…cantly lower than in the other limited liability environments.
Although a low default payment yields the most aggressive bidding, default limits the revenue collected by the seller to a fraction of the auction price. The highest revenue is achieved in the resale treatment, where more aggressive bidding leads to higher prices without default.
Moreover, resale outperformed the other environments in terms of e¢ ciency since it provides an opportunity to correct an ine¢ cient auction allocation. From the bidder's perspective, resale and the low default penalty are most e¤ective in mitigating losses.
While we provide a …rst empirical look into bidders'response across liability requirements, there are a number of key di¤erences between the environments tested and the …eld that should be taken into account when interpreting our results. First, we assumed an automated default choice and did not consider future penalties in reputation or monetary payments. In the …eld, bidders may be unwilling to exercise a default option for reputation reasons, so our results are more informative for auctions where repeated interaction is unlikely. Second, the resale market was also automated and took place immediately after the auction if gains from trade existed. While resale does not bear the same stigma as default, market frictions like incomplete information may limit the e¢ ciency and the probability of resale in the …eld, which would lower the limited liability incentives provided by resale.
In sum, the level of liability (high or low) and type of limited liability (statutory or through resale) are both critical factors in ‡uencing the behavioral response of bidders. Our results suggest that both sellers and bidders may prefer to have post-auction resale as a mechanism to limit losses of bidders who are uncertain about their values, while simultaneously increasing revenue. In all cases, liability requirements must be carefully considered when designing auction markets, as they will a¤ect the revenue and e¢ ciency achieved.
A. Appendix A.1. Equilibrium Bidding Functions.
Consider …rst Limited Liability through Resale. In this case,
Moreover, E [x j ji wins ] = 
Finally, notice that
and
Therefore, when x i < 20, This yields the equilibrium bidding function (2.2).
Consider now Limited Liability through Default. Notice that a bidder never bids more than x i + ", his highest possible use value. When " i = ", the winning bidder never defaults (since a bidder never pays an auction price higher than x i + " and hence his pro…t from not defaulting is strictly positive when " i = "). When " i = 0, the winning bidder defaults if
Suppose that bidder i defaults if " i = 0. Since losing the auction yields a pro…t of 0, in a second-price auction the bidder bids a price p such that his expected payo¤ from winning the auction is equal to zero -i.e.,
Of course, bidder i never defaults if his pro…t from not defaulting is greater than the default penalty, when he wins the auction at price p and " i = 0 -i.e., when
(In other words, p < x i 1 if x i > x , so that bidder i has no incentive to bid a price that makes default attractive.) In this case, bidder i bids x i + " 2 , the price at which his expected pro…t is equal to zero when he always pay the auction price. Therefore, the equilibrium bidding function with default is (2.3). 
A.2. Additional Regressions

